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(Review) Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of 
Law and Justice 
Abstract 
This elegant, wide-ranging and stimulating book has everything but the music. In graphic form, even the 
music is available as a frontispiece to each chapter, introduced with an extract from the score of the 
music for which it is named. The work begins with a ‘Prelude’ and ‘Fugue’ (Bach) and has a ‘Requiem’ 
(Mozart) on the death penalty, while ‘Quartet for the End of Time’ (Messiaen) opposes modernism and the 
reification of law, looking to space (in legal geography), rather than time, for the source of a ‘critical 
pluralism’. Surprisingly, this apparently precious device works, and it works at a number of levels. 
Analogies with the pieces of music help to illustrate the point of each chapter and the playful 
counterpoint between the music and the argument is a source of, well, aesthetic pleasure. By drawing our 
attention to the appreciation of formal structure shared by music and law, as in the sparse, elegant prose 
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This elegant, wide-ranging and stimulating book has everything but the music. In graphic form, 
even the music is available as a frontispiece to each chapter, introduced with an extract from 
the score of the music for which it is named. The work begins with a ‘Prelude’ and ‘Fugue’ 
(Bach) and has a ‘Requiem’ (Mozart) on the death penalty, while ‘Quartet for the End of Time’ 
(Messiaen) opposes modernism and the reification of law, looking to space (in legal 
geography), rather than time, for the source of a ‘critical pluralism’. Surprisingly, this 
apparently precious device works, and it works at a number of levels. Analogies with the 
pieces of music help to illustrate the point of each chapter and the playful counterpoint between 
the music and the argument is a source of, well, aesthetic pleasure. By drawing our attention to 
the appreciation of formal structure shared by music and law, as in the sparse, elegant prose of 
the opening ‘Prelude’, Desmond Manderson uses the format of the book to illustrate his theory. 
  
The book’s argument is simple and inclusive: law is based on aesthetics. This is not just seen in 
the literary devices of judges or the architecture of the court or the trial, but suffuses all legal 
practice and judgement. ‘Where is the aesthetic in law? The answer is, everywhere’ (p. 201). A 
committed pluralist, Manderson finds an aesthetic basis for the diversity of legal regimes. This 
does not simply apply to various social groups, but also explains individual interpretations: 
‘law means something to me which is different from what it means to you, just as does a piece 
of music or a book’ (p. 175). The radical relativism that this position could imply is tempered 
by the possibility of moral persuasion that forms part of Manderson’s very social conception of 
aesthetics. 
 
This robust theory of aesthetics owes most to George Santayana: it includes symbols and 
sensory force, shared culture and personal experience. His appreciation of semiotics is broad 
(even transatlantic: Peirce and Kevelson as well as Goodrich and Derrida), yet he rejects the 
semiotic assumption that there is ‘something else’ behind the surface: ‘There is nothing 
contingent about the surface, the image: it is itself a system of meaning and a representation of 
culture’ (p. 39). The important message of this work is that we can still make judgements while 
concentrating on the surface. These are aesthetic judgements with practical consequences 
throughout law and legal scholarship.  
 
Manderson makes aesthetics do a lot of work. It carries the burden well, if better in some areas 
than others. Methodologically, the aesthetics of law helps to explain many legal phenomena, 
and becomes a valuable perspective to guide research. It can be used to interrogate historical 
statutes, as in ‘Motet’, where a study of English statutes from the 13th to the 16th centuries 
reveals the changing audience to whom they are addressed (from agents of the king to 
subjects). In ‘Variations on a Theme’, drug laws are seen as an expression of an aesthetic 
judgement of cleanliness and filth, the basis of the boundary of crime between insiders and 
outsiders. Here, and in ‘Requiem’, aesthetics is at its strongest, allowing an understanding of 
particular laws while offering a basis for their critique. 
 
As a foundation for legal reasoning or justice, aesthetics is up against a long tradition of 
alternatives. In theories of legal reasoning, it is not offered much opposition by the positivist 
common law orthodoxy of Hart or other versions of naïve rationalism, Manderson’s favourite 
target.1 However, traditions of phronesis and rhetoric from Aristotle to Gadamer offer a vision 
of justice and practical moral reasoning that has much in common with Manderson’s 
aesthetics. Each comprehends the diversity of ‘local knowledges’ and seeks a reason of the 
heart as well as the head, which can make fair decisions, or criticize unfair laws, in an 
imperfect world. This book is a useful contribution to the rehabilitation of a pre- (or post-) 
Kantian conception of aesthetic reasoning which does not relegate such judgements to the 
realm of taste. Its somewhat hasty move from an aesthetics of law to one of justice in the final 
chapter would benefit from a broader appreciation of its place in this project. 
 
In a book sparkling with a breadth of sources and illustrations (without pictures), the musical 
and literary sources work better than those from science or its history. The celebration of chaos 
theory as a metaphor for a critical pluralism is more confusing than instructive. The discussion 
of the discovery of perspective in the context of 13th-century statutes would have added more 
to the work on the 15th century, where Manderson’s dates show it belongs. 
 
A book on law and aesthetics devoting more attention to music than to visual arts or literature 
would in itself be a valuable corrective to previous studies. This book achieves much more by 
proposing, with beautiful clarity, a way of approaching law through aesthetics which allows for 
pluralism with judgement, and for reason with feeling. The musical theme reinforces the 
message of the text by drawing down the visceral impact of music into legal discourse. This is 
movingly illustrated by applying Mozart’s commentary on death in his ‘Requiem’ to the death 
penalty which, as Manderson shows, pretends it is about anything but death. The University of 




1. Manderson does not only choose easy targets. While influenced by Derrida, he criticizes the 
latter (in common with so many others) for concentration on performative law, noting that 
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